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AMPHIBIOUS OPER ATIONS AND THE
EVOLUTION OF AUSTR ALIAN DEFENSE POLIC Y
Peter J. Dean

S

ince its European settlement in 1788, Australia has been dependent on greatpower protectors for its security. Initially this security was achieved by virtue
of Australia’s status as a British colony, later as a member of the British Commonwealth. In return for its protection, Australia committed military forces in
support of British interests to the Sudan, in the Boer War, and in the First and
Second World Wars. Australian support for these actions was premised on two
key factors: Australia’s membership in the Empire (and with that the identity of
its citizens as “independent Australian-Britons”) and the assessment, universal
among Australians, that support and protection of the Empire and of British
interests were also in their interest.
However, the fall of Singapore in 1942 was a
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order through a strong liberal, internationalist approach to diplomacy and, on
the other, alliances with major Western powers and a credible, capable, and permanent Australian military force for the defense of the home territory.3
Following the Second World War, Australia strongly supported the establishment of the United Nations, forged a new security partnership with Great Britain,
and, along with New Zealand, formed the ANZUS alliance with the United States.
Australian support for the West in the Cold War and the British presence in the
Far East led to commitment of troops to Malaya and Malaysia in the 1950s and
1960s, and its emerging relationship with the United States would see it sending
forces to Korea and Vietnam. Continued support for U.S. global leadership and
Western liberal democratic values into the post–Cold War and post-9/11 eras
would lead Australia to commit forces to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As a consequence of this “expeditionary strategy,” by which its armed forces have
been used principally in support of its major alliance partners rather than in direct defense of Australian territory, Australia’s approach to war fighting has come
to be distinguished by the “quality of its expeditionary infantry, who are usually
sent overseas as part of a wider coalition and depend on a larger ally for logistical
and other support.”4
This expeditionary approach to strategy—embracing a major alliance partner
while maintaining a degree of defensive self-reliance—has led to tensions in
Australian strategic policy. These tensions have been manifest in the need both to
develop forces that can be used to support alliance partners in distant operational
areas and to maintain capabilities to meet strategic interests and objectives in its
immediate region and for the defense of the continent. Amphibious warfare represents an intersection of these needs and therefore a focal point for understanding the tension between them.5
This article traces the role of amphibious operations in the evolution of Australian defense policy. It argues that the Australian experience with amphibious
operations has been ironic, in that while Australia’s military forces conducted
them in both world wars to support its interests and those of its major alliance
partners, the potential for managing the nation’s own regional security was not
realized. Thus, during the Cold War and immediate post–Cold War years the
amphibious capabilities of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) were not robust.
However, with the end of the Cold War the ADF was forced to reorient its security strategy toward one requiring moderate projection and sustainment of forces
to promote regional stability. As the necessary capabilities were being developed
in response to the demands of the new era of “Regional Defence,” moreover,
major shifts in the strategic environment were under way.6 The rise of China, the
movement of the global strategic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region, and,
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after 2011, the U.S. “pivot,” or “rebalance,” to the region have reshaped Australia’s
security future.
As the nation commits itself accordingly to a strategy of both maritime security and regional engagement, what emerges is an end to what has been described
as the “tyranny of dissonance” in Australian strategic policy. As a result, amphibious operations are finally coming of age in Australia and will play a more crucial
role in the nation’s defense policy for the “Asian Century.”7
AUSTRALIA’S ENDURING STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES
Australia’s dependence on its two major alliance partners, Great Britain and the
United States, and the dominance of an expeditionary approach in its strategy
and use of military force have been a result of Australia’s enduring strategic geography and circumstances. Australia is the sixth-largest country in the world and
the only one of the largest six to be surrounded completely by water. With an area
of 7,618,493 square kilometers and 59,736 kilometers of coastline, it is not only an
island but also a country and a continent. Australia, which has a strongly Western
cultural identity, is a classic trade-dependent maritime state. As the then Chief of
the Defence Force, General David Hurley, remarked in March 2014,
If Australia was to be described as an organism, a startling characteristic would be
that most of its vital organs exist outside its body. Over 50 percent of Australia’s
[gross domestic product] has an external basis. Australia’s national interests require
that for its prosperity and future stability, it must be able to shape its strategic environment and respond to threats to those vital organs. This is not, for example, merely
the protection of Sea Lines of Communications and freedom of navigation, but rather
8
the protection of trade itself.

The combination of its location in Asia and its cultural heritage, deriving
largely from its British settlement in 1788, along with its small population, large
land mass, and rich natural resources, means that Australians have always sensed
acutely a “tyranny of distance” from their major ally and the West, a sense that
“gave rise to popular fear[s]—which still linger in the collective consciousness—
that the country [is] indefensible.”9
It is for this reason that since its settlement Australia has relied for its security
on the exercise by a major Anglo-Saxon maritime power of dominance over the
Asia-Pacific. From 1788 until 1941 this power was the Royal Navy and from 1942
the U.S. Navy.10 Throughout its history Australia’s ability to pursue an expeditionary strategy to defend its interests and values has always depended on a stable
Asia-Pacific, largely devoid of tension and major strategic competition. Not only
that, but when Australia has committed forces to Europe and the Middle East,
its “great and powerful friends” have themselves been guaranteeing its maritime
security in Asia.11
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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This expeditionary approach to strategy and war fighting has, it has been
argued, been at odds with a peacetime Australian strategic policy tending to
the defense of geography—that is, continental defense, generally referred to as
“Defence of Australia.”12 This has led to the aforementioned “tyranny of dissonance,” between Australia’s strategic theory and its actual conduct of military
operations.13 Defense of the continent, that is, butts up against Australia’s strong
affiliation with Anglo-Saxon culture, democracy, and Western diplomacy and
values and its tradition of committing forces in pursuit of interests in such areas
as Europe (First and Second World Wars) and the Middle East (the world wars,
the Gulf War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).14
So binary a distinction between continental defense and expeditionary strategy has left little room for amphibious warfare in Australian defense policy. The
former has relied on Australia’s two powerful allies to provide its first line of
defense while Australia’s own military forces focused on the “air-sea gap” to the
continent’s north. The latter has involved niche, single-service, distant contingencies, sometimes described as “wars of choice,” as part of coalitions with major
alliance partners.
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND “IMPERIAL DEFENCE”
Dependence on the British Empire and Imperial Defence (see note 6) in the
period after Federation in 1901 meant that Australia’s military forces were little
interested in amphibious warfare. Counterintuitively, however, Australia’s firstever national military action came in the form of a joint expeditionary operation
with an amphibious component.15 In 1914, the Australian Naval and Military
Expeditionary Force was created and dispatched to secure German New Guinea.
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) provided “means for deployment, force protection, sustainment, command and control, support, and landing parties.”16 The
army provided, at very short notice, a 1,500-strong battalion group for a number
of landings in New Guinea to defeat the light-armed indigenous troops under
German command. However, although it “demonstrated the usefulness of joint
forces in the defence of Australian interests,” this small and brief campaign was
soon forgotten in the maelstrom of the Australian Army’s actions at Gallipoli in
1915 and in the Middle East and on the western front between 1916 and 1918.17
Australia secured possession of New Guinea at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which concluded the First World War. In the same negotiations the
Japanese used their support for the Allied powers during the war and their occupation of Germany’s Pacific colonies in the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall
Islands to push for their annexation. Their success in effect cemented Japanese
“domination of the central and western Pacific,” an outcome that radically altered the strategic position of both Australia and the United States.18 Australia’s
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/5
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acquisition of German New Guinea and its excellent harbor at Rabaul on New
Britain and the Japanese annexation of the central Pacific Islands made the two
uncomfortably close neighbors in the southwestern Pacific.19
Despite the experience of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary
Force in the South Pacific in 1914 and the requirement to protect and sustain
Australia’s newly won colonial possessions during the interwar period, amphibious operations were almost entirely absent from Australian defense planning.20
In fact, only one amphibious exercise was undertaken between the world wars.
In 1935, Tasmanian militia forces from the 40th Battalion landed at Blackman’s
Bay, south of Hobart, from the cruisers HMAS Canberra and HMS Sussex. This
sole military exercise, evidence of the paucity of interest in amphibious warfare,
was remarkable only “for [its] air of unreality.”21
In the interwar period Australia placed its faith in the Singapore Strategy for
its defense against Japanese aggression in the Pacific, despite the clearly understood problems with this one-dimensional naval strategy.22 The naval “fortress”
at Singapore and the need to contribute to Imperial Defence saw Australia raise
a second all-volunteer expeditionary force for service in Europe and the Middle
East at the start of the Second World War; the majority of this force was sent overseas in early 1940. The bulk of the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF),
including the 6th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Divisions, plus considerable elements
of the RAN and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), would serve in the Middle
East until the outbreak of the Pacific War at the end of 1941. The majority would
return to Australia and the Pacific soon after, but the 9th Division did not return
until the beginning of 1943, and a number of RAN ships and RAAF squadrons
were to remain in the Middle East for most of that year.23
THE PACIFIC WAR
The fall of Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and Australian New Guinea in early
1942 radically changed Australia’s strategic circumstances. For the first and only
time in its history, Australia faced a genuine threat of invasion. The loss of the territories to the north was soon followed by the bombing of Darwin and a Japanese
air offensive against northern Australia.24 The establishment of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under the American general Douglas MacArthur by the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff helped to secure Australia;25 nevertheless, MacArthur had to
spend the majority of 1942 defending the last remaining Allied bastion to Australia’s north, Papua. Notwithstanding this initial defensive stance, it soon became
apparent to MacArthur that a maritime strategy, one formed around land-based
airpower and amphibious operations and embracing the concept of maneuver,
was needed to defeat the Japanese in the region.26 MacArthur’s headquarters
proposed an offensive based on island hopping, each jump of no more than three
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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hundred miles (480 kilometers) in order to ensure fighter cover for the SWPA’s
strike aircraft and heavy bombers. It also proposed the use of combined-arms
task forces to undertake these amphibious landings, with heavy naval support
under the cover of air umbrellas.27
MacArthur’s principal strike weapon, however, was his air force. His strategy
rested on air superiority, enabling sea control to allow his amphibious force
to leapfrog forward, establishing airfields, ports, and logistical bases to allow
the advance to continue and isolating large numbers of Japanese troops on islands and around areas not assaulted.28 The problem was that the majority of
MacArthur’s ground and naval forces from 1942 to early 1944 were Australian,
neither equipped nor trained to conduct amphibious operations.29 It would take
MacArthur and his American and Australian commanders over a year to establish amphibious training schools for the army and navy, as well as to acquire the
necessary specialized equipment.30
During 1943–45 the Australian Army with support from its U.S. ally in the
SWPA would conduct a number of joint expeditionary operations utilizing amphibious warfare. This would include four division-sized amphibious assaults,
one brigade-sized assault, dozens of battalion- or company-sized landings and
hundreds of amphibious transportation operations. The most critical of these
occurred in New Guinea in 1943 and in Borneo in 1945.31 Meanwhile the RAN’s
landing ships HMAS Manoora, Kanimbla, and Westralia would form a core part
of the U.S. Navy’s VII Amphibious Force throughout the SWPA in 1943–45,
as did the landing craft, destroyers, and cruisers from the RAN that supported
MacArthur.32
THE COLD WAR
As a result of the Australian experience of joint and combined amphibious expeditionary operations in its immediate region during the Pacific War, the 1946
and 1947 “Appreciation of the Strategical Position” prepared by the Chiefs of Staff
Committee recommended the development of a “mobile RAN Task Unit consisting of aircraft carriers with their escort[,] . . . [a] Fleet Train[,] . . . Amphibious
craft for combined operations[,] . . . [and] Standard [army] formations designed
for . . . amphibious operations, but capable of conversion to meet the conditions
of jungle warfare.”33
This rather ambitious force structure was not taken up by the government.
The threat of the Cold War and the fact that by 1950 Australia again found itself
providing niche, single-service contributions to overseas coalitions, this time
in Korea, meant that amphibious operations drifted from priority. Australia
moved into what was known as the era of “Forward Defence” (1955–72), a period that, along with the overlapping Commonwealth Defence (1901–42 and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/5
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1945–69—again, see note 6), would once again see Australia concentrate on
securing its interests and supporting Western values and objectives in conjunction with its major alliance partners, far from its shores.34 The default condition
seemed to be that the farther away from Australia’s immediate region its military
operations were, the less they had to do with amphibious warfare.
Thus it was for the Australian deployment to Vietnam. Here the Australian
services fought singly alongside their American and South Vietnamese counterparts. Amphibious warfare played no role for the Australian commitment, but
because of the lack of amphibious transportation and logistics ships and the need
for maritime sustainment of the 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy Province,
one of the RAN’s two aircraft carriers, HMAS Sydney, was pressed into service to
move troops and supplies to South Vietnam. The ship was soon nicknamed the
“Vung Tau ferry.”35
THE DEFENSE OF AUSTRALIA
At the conclusion of the Vietnam War and with the establishment of the Nixon
Doctrine (by which the United States reduced its direct involvement in the defense of allies), Australian strategic policy shifted toward a focus on the “Defence
of Australia.” This continental-defense posture was based on a “need for greater
self-reliance and the ability to act independently” in the defense of continental
Australia and the necessity to “prepare for low level contingencies.”36 This basic
premise was accepted by the conservative Coalition government of Malcolm
Fraser and later the Bob Hawke–Paul Keating Labor governments. The resulting
emphasis on the Defence of Australia at the “air-sea gap”—Australia’s northern
approaches—meant that the army would focus on the protection of the mainland
against low-level incursions. Meanwhile, air and maritime forces would deter
major-power threats. This defensive “self-reliance” was to be achieved within the
alliance (ANZUS) framework.37
The new strategy offered little prospect for the development of an Australian
amphibious capability. In fact the influential 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence,
which had been commissioned by the minister of defense Kim Beazley, noted
that the ADF’s amphibious lift capability “is limited” and recommended the
gradual running down of what was left.38 By mid-1986 the few ships and landing
craft of the RAN’s “Australian Amphibious Squadron [had been] disbanded.”39
The review declared that the 5,800-ton heavy landing ship HMAS Tobruk and
supply ship HMAS Jervis Bay were between them “sufficient to support any modest deployments of ground forces or their equipment that could not be handled
by aircraft or land transport.” The six heavy landing craft (LCHs) were to be used
only for “coastal hydrographic work or maintained in the operational reserve.”
Finally, “there is no requirement to plan now for their [LCH] replacement, nor
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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is there any need for additional . . . [ships] of the Tobruk class.”40 This approach,
as a commentator noted, “left the Army, in particular, with little capacity for, or
doctrinal interest in, the projection of military power at a distance.”41
The perception that there was little need for force-projection capabilities,
given the strategic focus on sea denial in the defense of continental Australia, was
soon to reveal its shortcomings with regard to regional interests. In May 1987,
in Suva, the capital of the Melanesian island nation of Fiji—about two thousand
kilometers north of New Zealand and some three thousand east of Brisbane, in
Queensland—Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka and elements of the Royal Fiji
Military Forces staged a coup. The Australian government of Prime Minister Bob
Hawke asked the ADF whether it could rescue the deposed Fijian prime minister,
Timoci Bavadra. The Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Gration, quickly
explained the insurmountable obstacles. However, foreseeing a requirement to
conduct a protected evacuation of some four thousand Australian nationals, the
Operational Deployment Force, based in Townsville, Queensland, was flown
by RAAF C-130 Hercules aircraft to Norfolk Island (roughly midway between
Australia and Fiji) and embarked in an “ad-hoc fashion” on board the warships
HMAS Parramatta and Sydney, the supply ship HMAS Success, and the RAN’s
only amphibious ship, Tobruk.42
For fifteen days these troops stood offshore between Norfolk and the Fiji
island of Viti Levu, then returned to Australia. This period revealed the poor
state of joint capability in the ADF—inadequate doctrine, poor communications
between services, shortage of amphibious ships and craft, and the absence of
operating concepts. As one observer noted, “Operation Morris Dance [as the Fiji
operation was designated] provided a sobering demonstration of the limits of
Australian military power in the late 1980s. Even if it had wanted to or needed to,
Australia simply could not have deployed a land force into the South Pacific safely
and effectively if there was any prospect of onshore opposition to such a move.”43
The critical fault was that the Defence of Australia strategy had excluded
force-protection capabilities. While single-service expeditionary deployments
with allies could be undertaken with the existing force structure designed for the
defense of Australia, the lack of force-protection capabilities meant that Australia
lacked the capacity to deal with regional security problems.44 This shortcoming
had been tolerated despite the fact that it had been long recognized that the expeditionary strategy almost invariably involved “wars of choice,” while deployments
in the immediate region were, and would continue to be, “non-discretionary.”45
While Defence of Australia dominated strategic thinking and force-structure
priorities from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, some in the ADF acknowledged
during the 1980s that given the size of the Australian continent, an amphibious
capability could play a significant role.46 However, any action was hamstrung by
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/5
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a debate within some sections of the Department of Defence over the concept of
“non-offensive defence,” put forward in a review, commissioned in May 1989, of
civil-military relationships in Australia by a former Deputy Secretary of Defence,
Alan Wrigley. His report, The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership
in Australia’s Defence, released in June 1990, recommended placing the defense
of the continent in the hands of largely part-time forces and restricting the
regular ADF to overseas deployments in a constabulary role. Wrigley’s views of
“non-offensive defence,” it was pointed out, implied that not even a “defensive”
amphibious force could be supported, for fear that it might be destabilizing for
the region.47 In addition, the Hawke government made it clear that it found the
“offensive nature” of an amphibious capability, like that of the RAN’s aircraft carrier capability, which was retired at this time, “inappropriate for Australia’s force
structure.”48
The government rejected Wrigley’s recommendations, although the 1991
Force Structure Review did cut the size of the army and transferred a number
of its combat capabilities from regular to reserve forces.49 However, arguably,
the most significant impediment to the development of amphibious capabilities
in the ADF at this time was a lack of institutional interest from the navy and,
especially, the army.50 The post–Cold War era would see Australia again making
single-service military contributions to distant “wars of choice,” this time in support of United Nations sanctions against Iraq and later in the first Persian Gulf
War, 1990–91.51
As has been noted, the 1980s and 1990s were “a dark period for amphibious
and joint operations, which were only kept alive in largely unread doctrine or
through heavily orchestrated training exercises.”52 However, concurrently with
international deployments, post–Cold War Australian strategic policy was also
concerning itself with instability in the immediate region; the period from 1997 to
2001 was in fact the era of “Regional Defence.” The year 1999 saw Australia’s most
significant military operation since Vietnam, the International Force for East
Timor (INTERFET), a peacekeeping mission undertaken in response to the conflict between East Timorese pro-independence supporters and pro-Indonesian
militias (supported by regular Indonesian forces). During INTERFET the “ADF
[would] rediscover the importance of joint operations to national security.”53
EAST TIMOR AND REGIONAL OPERATIONS
The realization of the limitations of the ADF’s force-projection capabilities after
MORRIS DANCE in Fiji, coupled with concern over growing instability in the
South Pacific, had led to a revised strategic guidance, in the 1991 Force Structure
Review, acknowledging a need to “respond to regional requests.”54 In particular,
the review noted that “the ADF currently has no single vessel capable of operating
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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a number of helicopters simultaneously.”55 This led to a decision to replace the
roll-on/roll-off support ship Jervis Bay with a dedicated training and helicoptersupport ship. However, in 1993 the government balked at the expected $500A
million price tag for a purpose-built vessel and decided instead, in 1994, to acquire two surplus U.S. Navy Newport-class 8,500-ton tank landing ships, redesignated as “Landing Platforms Amphibious” (LPAs).56 This was “an important,
positive [move in the] use of the sea for [a] military purpose [that] added to the
1987 [Defence of Australia] construct.”57
Nevertheless, 1999 found the ADF woefully short on the amphibious capability it needed to undertake INTERFET. The acquisition of the LPAs “could not
disguise the years of institutional and doctrinal neglect, cost cutting and lack
of single-service interest” in amphibious operations.58 In any case, the LPAs
Kanimbla and Manoora had not completed refitting and were not yet in service
when Australia decided that year to send a stabilization mission to East Timor.59
This left the RAN with only Tobruk (long overdue for maintenance), the recently
leased fast catamaran (a new HMAS Jervis Bay), and three heavy landing craft.
These vessels were supplemented by the RAN’s replenishment and supply ship
Success, soon reinforced by ships from the Canadian, New Zealand, Singaporean,
and U.S. navies, as well as seventeen commercially chartered vessels.60
The ADF was exceptionally lucky that it was able to secure the harbor of Dili,
the capital, and its one wharf and crane, before it could be damaged by forces
opposing East Timorese independence.61 Loss of this critical node would have
severely hampered the ability of the ADF, with its one small amphibious ship, to
build decisive force ashore rapidly and then sustain it. Furthermore, these amphibious forces proved especially significant, as INTERFET pushed out from Dili
and its immediate surrounds. As has been argued, “coalition maritime capabilities
and, above all, amphibious units proved essential to any realistic efforts to make
land forces mobile over long distances.”62 To facilitate these moves, Tobruk and
the RAN’s heavy landing craft conducted numerous over-the-beach lodgments.
RAN and coalition amphibious forces, then, were critical to the success of
INTERFET. Its commander, General Peter Cosgrove, would state the ADF amphibious assets were a “capability of first resort.” While in many respects this
is unsurprising, given the archipelagic nature of the region, INTERFET served
to highlight not only the potential requirement for amphibious operations but
also the ADF’s stark lack of such capability at the time.63 These deficiencies were
particularly noticeable once the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ship USS Belleau
Wood (LHA 3) started to provide heavy lift with its Marine Corps CH-53E Super
Stallion helicopters.64
The East Timor experience was ultimately to herald a new era for amphibious warfare in Australian policy and strategy.65 By 2000 Manoora and Kanimbla
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/5

10

30

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Dean: Amphibious Operations and the Evolution of Australian Defense Pol

were available and in concert with Tobruk formed the first RAN amphibious
ready group (ARG) since the end of the Second World War. This increase in
RAN capability was matched by a resurgence in the Australian Army’s doctrinal
interest in amphibious operations. This new doctrine was established on the
back of U.S. concepts such as “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” which had
developed after the Cold War as the U.S. Navy transitioned from the conception
of a blue-water fleet as envisioned by the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan to an
idea of maritime strategy that, reminiscent of the theoretician Sir Julian Corbett,
focused heavily on force projection, support of forces ashore, and expeditionary
operations.66
For the Australian Army, such ideas were developed under the rubric of
MOLE (Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment). However, its development in the land forces soon stagnated. Against the background of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in the post–September 11 era, MOLE “has long
been overshadowed by [Army doctrine development on] Complex Warfighting
and the Hardened and Networked Army scheme, [which] . . . merged into the
comprehensive framework of Adaptive Campaigning.”67
In the years after 2001 the ADF undertook its regional-security operations,
which relied so heavily on the RAN’s amphibious assets, at the same time that it (in
particular, the army) became involved intensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus
during the past decade two of the major drivers of Australian defense strategy
—far-off expeditionary deployments (Iraq and Afghanistan) and regional operations (East Timor in 2003 and 2006, Bougainville, and the Solomon Islands)—
have been undertaken concurrently. This has placed enormous strain on the
ADF’s resources and has led to two very different sets of experiences and lessons.
In some cases, such as the army’s MOLE doctrine, the Middle East experience
would overshadow, though not eclipse, thinking and concept development for
regional amphibious operations.
The first operational deployment of the ARG was in 2006, when the ADF was
again required to intervene in East Timor as the security situation deteriorated.
Its three ships were able to land an infantry battalion group within three days,
including armored and support vehicles and three Blackhawk helicopters. They
did so entirely over the beach, as, unlike in 1999, the Dili harbor facilities were
not secured.68 This was a considerable achievement for assets that sixteen years
earlier had been deemed “inappropriate.”69
In the years after MORRIS DANCE the ADF’s amphibious assets had also seen
extensive service in Vanuatu (1988), in Somalia (1993), and on Bougainville
(1990 and 1994). The ARG also has since played a critical role in the support of
the Australian response to the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Aceh region
of Indonesia.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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In light of the lessons from Somalia, Bougainville, and East Timor, the John
Howard government’s white paper Defence 2000 committed the nation to purchasing two new amphibious vessels to replace Tobruk, Manoora, and Kanimbla.
This met the third of the paper’s five objectives—“Stabilization of South West
Pacific,” which the government deemed a “self-reliant task” (although it expected
support from New Zealand).70 The “main requirements for the RAN force structure that flow[ed] from this objective . . . [were] . . . for a capability to patrol South
Pacific waters, and for amphibious lift.”71
The 2003 Defence Capability Review noted that “both frigates and amphibious ships have been engaged constantly since September 2001 across a full
spectrum of operations. Additionally, the importance to the Government of the
ability to safely deploy, lodge and sustain Australian forces offshore has been
re-emphasised.”72 As a result, the government announced that the replacement
amphibious ships would be “large vessels” and would be supplemented by an
additional sealift ship. By the release of the Defence Capability Plan 2004–2014,
the size of these two ships had doubled from that envisaged in 2000.73 The plan
had evolved to a decision to purchase two 27,500-ton, Spanish-designed ships
of the LHD (landing helicopter dock) type, the largest vessels that the RAN has
ever operated. Each of these ships, when operational (late 2014 and 2016), will
be able to deliver ashore in three hours what the RAN’s ARG needed three days
for in East Timor in 2006.74
THE END OF “DISSONANCE”?
The irony of Australian expeditionary warfare is that the forces the ADF has
consistently deployed to distant theaters generally do not actually conduct joint
expeditionary operations. Truly expeditionary, and amphibious, operations
have occurred only close to the Australian homeland. The reductive and binary
debates, therefore, over Australia’s strategic policy as a choice between an expeditionary strategy and Defence of Australia have been particularly unhelpful in
understanding the role that amphibious operations have played in achieving the
nation’s strategic objectives.
In particular an “expeditionary strategy” / “Defence of Australia” distinction
obscures the requirement for Australia’s military forces to operate in the zone
between the continent itself and far-off deployment zones—that is, notably, in
the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. This region has long been characterized
by Australian strategic policy as the nation’s “area of direct military interest” or
“primary operating environment.” As the 2009 white paper noted, it is an “expansive strategic geography [that] requires an expeditionary orientation on the part
of the ADF at the operational level, underpinned by requisite force projection
capabilities.”75
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As the ADF has transitioned away from high-tempo operations in the
Middle East it has started to carry out its own “pivot,” or “rebalance,” toward
the Asia-Pacific region. This move is in response not only to the drawdown in
Afghanistan but also, and especially, to the shift of global strategic competition
and economic power to the Asia-Pacific. As a result, the “tyranny of dissonance”
between geography, on one side, and history, values, and political interests, on the
other, has begun to recede.76 Australian trade and investment are now becoming
firmly centered on the Asia-Pacific region; Australia’s major alliance partner, the
United States, has announced, as noted, a strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific;
Australia is now deeply engaged in stability operations in the South Pacific; and
Canberra is developing regional defense relations with such fellow democracies
and major trading partners as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Japan.77
In the process Australia is embracing a maritime strategy in which amphibious
and joint expeditionary operations in the Asia-Pacific region will play a significant role.78 This move was reflected in Defence White Paper 2013, which devotes a
section to maritime strategy (paragraphs 3.42–3.47) and refers to amphibious “capability,” “operations,” “training,” or “forces” no fewer than forty-three times. The
amphibious-related sections include discussions of “Joint and Enabling Forces”
(paragraphs 8.12–8.14), of “Land Forces,” of “Naval Forces,” and of the amphibious capability as the “central plank in our ability to conduct security and stabilisation missions in the [South Pacific] region” (paragraph 6.55); and of “cooperation and engagement activities in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste, including
bilateral or multilateral exercises with regional security forces” (paragraph 3.51).
This approach is set to continue under the conservative government of Tony
Abbott that was elected in late 2013. In the lead-up to the election, Abbott, then
opposition leader, and his shadow defense minister, David Johnston, committed
themselves to writing a new white paper on defense, a commitment they reaffirmed once in government. Johnston has suggested the central role that the new
LHDs will play. Speaking alongside the American and Japanese ambassadors to
Australia and the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry B.
Harris, Jr., at the Kokoda Foundation annual dinner in Canberra on 31 October
2013, Johnston emphasized their critical importance for regional engagement
and deeper relations with Australia’s allies and regional partners. Johnston called
this amphibious capability a major new “strategic asset for Australia.”79
The development of this “strategic” amphibious capability is a critical part
of the continuing close strategic partnership with the United States, a relationship that is taking on a new emphasis and new roles as a result of the American
“pivot.” As the 2014 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review noted, more will be asked
of Australia and other allies to “undergird the ability of the United States to face
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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future crises and contingencies” and especially to grow partners’ “capacity . . . [to]
play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their
respective regions.”80
Nonetheless, development of this capability presents enormous challenges to
Australia and the ADF. As the 2013 white paper notes, “the challenges for training
and institutional culture involved in developing the capability to conduct amphibious operations will be significant.”81 This challenge is manifest in the difficulties
the ADF has faced in developing clear strategic guidance, the slow progress of
amphibious concepts, and a lack of integration between some of the amphibious plans and projects managed by the Defence Materiel Organisation. Of major
concern is the erosion of the ADF’s littoral amphibious capabilities, especially
with the retirement of the heavy landing craft and the delays in implementing and
funding replacements for these and other brown-water assets as the LHDs come
online. As one ADF officer has observed, “You can’t ride a concept to the beach.”82
However, this is not a capability or institutional problem of the ADF alone.
Rather, in many respects it is reflective of much broader, national, cultural problems. These are barriers to the acceptance of a focus on the Asia-Pacific and
in particular of a maritime strategy for Australian defense policy. This issue is
a divide less between values, history, and geography than between continental
and maritime cultural outlooks: a result of the “peculiar trajectory of Australia’s
national culture . . . [which] has impeded a sense of maritime consciousness . . .
[—a] situation that is particularly reflected in defence policy.” But as has been
noted, this cultural hand brake is not immovable; rather “Australians, while respectful of their continental ethos, must increasingly seek to recast the national
cultural narrative towards the seas of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.”83
Such an approach, in terms both of national outlook and of the integration of
a maritime strategy into the ADF, is of paramount importance, given the focus on
the Asia-Pacific region. The changing nature of Australia’s strategic environment
is also critical. Although Australia’s “region has been at peace now for almost
40 years” and there is a “low likelihood of war between the major powers[,] . . .
miscalculation and misjudgement short of major war are a risk, as they have been
throughout history. And in our part of the world there are plenty of territorial and
ideological tensions and jockeying for influence by the rising powers.”84
Increased strategic competition in this region has important ramifications for
strategic policy and will make it much more difficult for any Australian government to participate in expeditionary deployments outside the Asia-Pacific region
in the future. In addition, given the low risk of a direct threat to the Australian
continent, a regional focus has become of overriding importance to Australia’s
strategic interests and objectives. The region to Australia’s north—a vast maritime,
littoral, and archipelagic region—presents the ADF with a land-sea-air operating
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/5
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environment, not an “air-sea gap.” It requires the ADF to be able not just to provide for continental defense or deploy alongside major alliance partners but also
to carry out joint maritime operations in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific
—operations that are critically dependent on a robust amphibious capability.85
With the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific, the rise of China, and the increasing
importance of both the immediate region and the wider Asia-Pacific to Australia’s strategic interests and objectives, the odds are that even more demands will
be made on the ADF’s emerging amphibious capability. This is especially true as a
modern, versatile amphibious capability could provide much more than the standard, orthodox roles of amphibious assault, raid, withdrawal, and demonstration.
Rather, a joint amphibious expeditionary force will also play key roles in humanitarian assistance, evacuation, and peacekeeping. It will increase the ADF’s
ability to assist friendly nations and undertake military diplomacy and combined
military exercises, as well as to provide “presence” and undertake preventative
diplomacy.86 This joint maritime force could also exert a high level of coercion,
especially through deterrence and compellance.87 These are all critical for strategic shaping;88 if utilized properly, they will be key elements of Australia’s policy of
engagement and of the ADF’s contribution to managing the peace in the immediate region. These capabilities highlight the prospect that despite its troubled past,
Australian amphibious warfare has an enduring role to play in contemporary
defense policy and strategy.89
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